This paper studies the impact of daily official foreign exchange interventions on the exchange rates of two EU candidate countries, namely Croatia and Turkey for the periods from 1996 to 2004 and from 2001 to 2004, respectively. Using the event study methodology and a variety of GARCH models reveals that both the Croatian and the Turkish central banks were in a position to influence, to some extent, the level of the exchange rate during the period studied. This lends support to the view that foreign exchange intervention may be effective to a limited extent in emerging market economies.
Introduction
The question of how, if at all, central bank interventions on the foreign exchange markets may impact on nominal exchange rates has triggered a large body of literature for the last 20 years or so of the post Bretton-Woods period in industrialized OECD economies. Although it is widely acknowledged that unsterilised interventions affect the exchange rate by altering relative money supplies, the empirical evidence is fairly mixed regarding the effectiveness of sterilized interventions, which may work through the portfolio, the signaling and the microstructure (or coordination) channels. In their literature survey, Sarno and Taylor (2001) conclude, however, that what emerges from studies focusing on the 1990s is that interventions tend to impact on the exchange rates, "especially if the intervention is publicly announced and concerted and provided it is consistent with the underlying stance of monetary and fiscal policy" 2 .
It is a well-documented fact that a large number of emerging market economies have moved recently from fixed exchange regimes towards more flexible exchange regimes. Nevertheless, extensive foreign exchange interventions were undertaken in these countries mainly driven by fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhard, 2000) or by a dread of depreciation, as suggested by Dutta and Leon (2002) . In this context, Canales-Kirjenko (2003) However, there is little empirical research conducted to investigate the effectiveness of central bank interventions in emerging and transition economies. 3 In this paper, daily intervention data are used to study the extent to which foreign exchange interventions were effective in Croatia from 1996 to 2004 and in Turkey from 2001 Turkey from to 2004 In a first step, we apply the event study approach, which is claimed to be superior to econometric analysis if interventions take place only sporadically (Fatum, 2000 and Fatum and Hutchison, 2003) , and analyze the influence of official interventions on the mean and the variance of the exchange rates vis-à-vis the German mark prior to 1999 and vis-à-vis the euro after 1999 for Croatia, and vis-à-vis the US dollar for
Turkey. In a second step, a variety of GARCH models are employed to get an econometric grip on the data.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches briefly monetary and exchange rate policies and foreign exchange interventions for Croatia and Turkey for the periods 1996 to 2004 and 2001 to 2004, respectively . Section 3 presents the results of the event study approach. Section 4 contains the estimation results of the different GARCH specifications and the causality tests. Section 5 finally gives some concluding remarks.
Exchange Rate Regimes and Foreign Exchange Interventions

Croatia
Croatia has been having a managed float exchange rate regime since the introduction of the kuna in April 1994. Exchange rate policy has been ever since oriented towards the German mark and subsequently towards the euro even if there was no official currency basket. During the period from January 1996 to November 2004, the exchange rate of the kuna was kept in a fluctuation band of -6.7%/+5.2% relative to the period average and the implicit fluctuation band was even narrower during some periods of time as can be seen from Figure 1 .
Nominal exchange rate targeting, which is publicly communicated by the Croatian National
Bank (see e.g. Croatian National Bank, 2001 Bank, , 2002 Bank, and 2003 , has its main goal to achieve price stability. Back in 1994, the managed floating regime and the new kuna were introduced to stem hyperinflation as high as 1518% on average in 1993. Yearly average inflation rapidly went down to 2.0% in 1995 and has been ever since in low single-digit territories (1.8% in 2003) . The nominal exchange rate target secures price stability through stable imported inflation (and via its second round effects), an important factor in a highly euroised country such as Croatia, and, perhaps more importantly, it acts as an anchor for inflation expectations.
The Croatian National Bank (CNB) regularly intervenes on the foreign exchange market to stabilise the kuna against the euro (German mark) in both directions. Excessive exchange rate movements are actually interpreted by the CNB as an appreciation or a depreciation of the kuna vis-à-vis the euro of about 2% and higher than 2% 5 . It should be noted that part of the exchange rate movements is due to seasonal factors. The kuna tends to depreciate at the beginning and at the end of the year because of a seasonal worsening of the current account, and it appreciates during the summer period because of an increased demand for kunas in the tourist season. If judged excessive, the central bank also acts to counteract seasonal movements in the exchange rate. CNB has recently made efforts to move towards more market-based instruments. In this attempt, it unified the kuna and foreign currency requirements in 2000 (e.g. regarding the calculation period and the maintenance period). Since 2001, the reserve requirement rate was decreased several times, and this was compensated by a widening of the calculation base (CNB, 2001 (CNB, , 2002 (CNB, , and 2003 . Days of intervention  1996 Total  73  23  1  369 96  39  Sales  124  98  4  369 100  22  Purchases  7  2  1  76  18  17  1997 Total  160  105  18  454 155  12  Sales  195  194  30  454 163  9  Purchases  57  32  18  120 56  3  1998 Total  109  85  1  475 96  43  Sales  67  58  1  219 59  19  Purchases  142  105  31  475 108  24  1999 Total  229  168  4  716 200  30  Sales  23  22  4  48  16  8  Purchases  304  299  59  716 182  22  2000 Total  467  533  112 702 225  8  Sales  490  593  180 684 206  5  Purchases  429  472  112 702 298  3  2001 Total  500  396  14 1488 378  20  Sales  455  396  14 1029 268  14  Purchases  606  397  54 1488 580  6  2002 Total  421  374  137 904 245  17  Sales  458  386  152 904 265  12  Purchases  332  326  137 564 183  5  2003 Total  444  458  99  646 171  9  Sales  646  646  646 646  0  1  Purchases  418  439  99  635 164  8  2004 Total  250  199  129 440 126  9  Sales  250  199  129 440 126  9  Purchases  ----------0  1996-2004 Total  232  152  1  1488 245  187  Sales  234  163  1  1029 236  99  Purchases  231  138  1  1488 256 88 Source: Author's calculations
Turkey
Although Turkey's exchange rate stabilization program, which rested on a pre-announced crawling peg exchange rate regime, had the merit to having brought down year-on-year inflation from 68.8% in December 1999 to 39% in December 2000, it culminated in a currency crisis in early 2001. As a result, a floating exchange rate regime was introduced on February 22, 2001. This was part of a new monetary policy, which can be best described as an implicit inflation targeting. Under this regime, the central bank pursues an inflation target at a given horizon in the future. The central bank's main instruments are short-term interest rates. The base money and net international reserves are used as "indicative criteria", which can be perhaps deemed as The role of foreign exchange interventions is understood to be limited in such a framework. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) has been stressing in its official publications that foreign exchange interventions should take place as rarely as possible and in a transparent manner (CBRT, 2001, p. 109 and CBRT, 2004, paragraph 34) . In addition to this, it is also emphasized that foreign exchange interventions do not intend to target any precise level of the exchange rate but aims to dampen excessive volatility instead and is used for building international reserves.
6 When considering exchange rate volatility, the central bank not only looks at past and present volatilities but also considers expected changes in volatility occurring in the future (CBRT, 2004, paragraph 26) .
However, reading between the lines may reveal that the central bank may give a lower weight to decreasing excessive exchange rate volatility and it may ponder to alter the trend of the exchange rate. According to CBRT (2002, p. 74) , "foreign exchange auctions were temporarily suspended as of July due to the volatilities of exchange rates", which is in contradiction with the declared intention to counteract excessive volatility. It is also mentioned several times that the central bank considers excessive volatility in both directions. Given that volatility is an absolute measure, this may indicate that the CBRT also looks at changes in the exchange rate.
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The central bank carries out several operations to sterilize foreign exchange interventions by means of (1) Turkish lira deposit operations in the interbank money market and (2) reverse repo transactions at the Istanbul Stock Exchange. It also ensures that short-term money market interest rates remain in line with the inflation target.
The interventions of the central bank were mostly carried out based on either discretionary or pre-announced auctions. However, the central bank also did some direct discretionary interventions on the forex markets. Total  53  50  20 274 51  124  Sales  ----------0  Purchases  53  50  20 274 51  124  2002 Total  24  20  4  40  10  33  Sales  24  20  4  40  10  33  Purchases  ----------0  2003 Total  43  50  2  80  18  117  Sales  43  50  2  80  18  117  Purchases  ----------0  2004 Total  40  40  30  70  11  62  Sales  40  40  30  70  11  62  Purchases  ----------0  2001-2004 Total  44  40  2  274 34  336  Sales  39  40  2  80  16  212  Purchases  53  50  20 274 (Fatum, 2000; Fatum and Hutchinson,2003) . A big advantage of the event study approach over time series techniques is that it only looks at periods when interventions take place, and is thus able to filter out longer periods during which no interventions happen and which might cause econometric studies to find no relation between foreign exchange interventions and exchange rate behavior.
When applying the event study approach, three issues have to be tackled: Regarding the definition of an intervention event, the question is of how many days may separate two single intervention acts going in the same direction (both purchases or both sales) can be considered as two distinct intervention events. If too few, say one or two, days, are taken as the boundary between two intervention events, overlaps between the pre-and post-event may occur, which makes it difficult to interpret the effect of a given intervention event on the exchange rate in the pre-and post event windows because of the simultaneous impact of the overlapping intervention events. Furthermore, setting the distance too short may lead to the overestimation of the intervention episodes. By contrast, if too large a distance is set between single interventions to form a common intervention episode, the risk then is to underestimate the number of true intervention episodes (Fatum, 2000) .
Five alternative definitions of the intervention event are considered in this study. We consider intervention events, which comprise single interventions in one direction between which up to 2, As to the size of the pre-and post-event windows, we look at six different lengths: 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 60. The pre-and post-event windows are constructed in a symmetric way implying that a 2-day (5-day etc.) pre-event window is compared to a 2-day (5-day etc.) post-event window. 10 In addition, effectiveness is also analyzed for the event window itself. The pre-event window is set to 2, 5, 10, 20 and 30 days if the event window size is equal or lower than 2 days (higher than 2 (5, 10, 20 and 30) but equal or lower than 5 (10, 20 and 30) ).
Finally, not only changes in the exchange rate but also changes in the volatility of the exchange rate can be analyzed. For this purpose, volatility measured as standard deviation over the (symmetric) pre-and post-event windows are compared.
Results
Croatia
Table 3 below documents that in Croatia, the identification of intervention episodes is fairly sensitive to the maximum days of no intervention elapsed between two single intervention acts.
Using maximum two days yields a total of 148 intervention episodes, and this number drops to 71 when 10 days are employed. When the criterion is set at 20 or 30 days, the number of identified episodes drops further to 49 and 46, respectively. Summary statistics are provided for each filter in Tables 4 and 5 . Despite the difference regarding the number of identified intervention episodes, a number of common features can be observed for the intervention episodes based on different filters. First, Table 4 documents the high number of episodes, for which the effectiveness of interventions can be addressed only for the pre-event window and the event window itself, but not for the post-event window because the next intervention episode starts the next day or one day later after the episodes considered. This is because the central bank changed the direction of the intervention, and after buying (selling) the domestic currency against the euro (German mark) on one day, it started selling (buying) the kuna the next day or so. In addition to this, for another bunch of episodes, the impact of the episode on changes in the exchange rate can be assessed only at the shorter horizons because of the short distance separating the episodes. The shorter the maximum days of no interventions used for the episode selection, the lower the number of non-overlapping longer pre-and postevent windows. Using maximum 2 days, 46% of the episodes can be assessed for the pre-and post-event window size of 5 days, and the share of assessable episodes for 10, 20 and 30-day post-event windows drops to 20%, 7% and 3%, respectively. For the post-event window of 60 days, all the episodes overlap with other episodes. Although the share of episodes with no overlap increases with the rise in the maximum days of no intervention, it is still fairly low. For maximum 30 days, for the 10-day post-event window, 35% of the episodes can be analyzed without overlaps occurring, and the share goes down to 11% for the 60-day post-event window.
Hence, the effectiveness of central bank interventions can be studied only partially for Croatia using the study event approach.
An episode is qualified as a success if the episode can be viewed as leaning against the wind (WIND), smoothing exchange rate movements (SMOOTH), or leaning with the wind (WITH) in accordance with the criteria explained in the previous section. Table 4 also reports successful and unsuccessful episodes as a share of non-overlapping episodes. The share of successful episodes is fairly high and stable for different post-window sizes and event sizes. It ranges from about 60% to 80%.
As far a the relative share of the three types of successful intervention (leaning with and against the wind and smoothing) is concerned, Table 4 reveals that the successful intervention the overwhelming majority of episodes classifies as either a leaning against the wind or exchange rate smoothing both within the event window or when comparing the pre-and post-event
periods. It appears that exchange rate smoothing is more dominant within the event window, but the share of leaning against the wind usually increases for pre-and post-event windows of 20, 30
and 60 days. This implies that interventions first start to decrease the pace of depreciation or appreciation, and as time passes, they even manage to change the trend on the foreign exchange market.
In Croatia, the decision regarding intervention is taken in the morning, and the auction (intervention) is held on the very same day, while the settlement of the intervention occurs two days later. This two-day window, which comprises the announcement of the intervention but which comprises no actual transaction, enables us to study the signaling effect of interventions.
In Table 4 , under "SIGNAL" are compared changes in the exchange rate prior to a 2-, 5-and 10-day pre-event window as compared to exchange rate developments in the two-day window. Table 4 indicates that there is a signaling effect, which is the most pronounced in the very short term (two-day pre-event window). Note: SIGNAL refers to the signaling effect, W in the third column refers to results obtained for the intervention episode itself (how does the exchange rate behave during the intervention episode, i.e. within the intervention window.
Regarding unconditional exchange rate volatility measured by means of standard deviation, it is fair to say according to results reported in Table 5 that interventions are associated with both increases and decreases in volatility broadly to the same extent. The share of intervention episodes that can be associated with higher exchange rate volatility after the episode than before it, is slightly higher, and, on average is close to 60%.
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As the overall pattern emerging for episodes using different event window and pre-and postevent window sizes, is fairly comparable, in-detail results are shown only for episodes obtained on the basis of maximum 30 days of no intervention in order to save ink and paper (Tables 6 and   7) . 12 In yellow are marked the pre-and post event windows without any overlap with previous or forthcoming intervention episodes. A point to draw attention to is that interventions seem to be less successful in the first part of the period under study. For the second part of the period, and especially from 2002 to 2004, interventions not only appear to be more effective than previously but also the share of leaning against the wind strategy increases dramatically.
Regarding exchange rate volatility, there are episodes for which whether or not volatility increases or decreases hinges largely upon the size of the pre-and post-event window. However, in a number of episodes, interventions systematically rise volatility such (episodes No. 1, 18, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 43 and 45) or dampen volatility (episodes No. 2, 8, 17, 26, 29, 37, 40 and 41) 11 It should be noted that for single-day episodes, volatility cannot be computed and this implies that exchange rate volatility cannot be studied for the episode window. 12 Results for the episodes determined on the basis of maximum 2, 5, 10 and 20 days of no interventions are available from the author upon request. Table 4 . HIGH (LOW) indicate that exchange rate volatility higher (lower) in the post-event window as compared to the pre-event window. 
Turkey
As shown in Table 3 Table 9 hereafter reports the results. In yellow are marked the pre-and post event windows without any overlap with previous or forthcoming intervention episodes. Given that 59 days elapsed without interventions after the third intervention episode, the pre-and post window size of 60 days cannot be assessed for the third and last episodes.
All four intervention episodes turn out to be very effective, and this for most pre-and post-event windows. The intervention episodes can be viewed mainly as leaning against the wind operations. Looking at the intervention windows 13 indicates that the first and third intervention episodes started as exchange rate smoothing, which subsequently managed to reverse the trend of the exchange rate against the US dollar. The third episode did so only at the 2, 5 and 10-day horizons beyond which it turned out to be exchange rate smoothing.
Finally, Table 10 reports the change in the standard deviation-based exchange rate volatility between the pre-and post-event window. The first intervention episode is the only episode during and after which exchange rate volatility decreased systematically as compared to the period preceding it. During the second and last episodes, exchange rate volatility was higher both in the event window and after the intervention episode. For the third episode, volatility first declined when interventions were taking place, but then increase up to 20 days following it. For the post-event windows of 30, 40 and 60 days, it is found to be lower than in the corresponding pre-event windows. 
Econometric Investigation
Econometric Issues
Interventions, Exchange Rates and Volatility
In this section, the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions is analyzed using a GARCH framework, which is admittedly well suited for such an investigation because they analyze simultaneously the mean and the conditional variance of the exchange rate series. In our economic specification, the starting point is the approach proposed by Dominguez (1998) for a GARCH(1,1) framework. That is, in the mean equation, the log-difference of the exchange rate ( t e ∆ , exchange rate returns) are regressed on the intervention series ( t I ), the interest differential
between overnight money market rates in the home economy and the foreign benchmark (Germany and the euro area for Croatia, and the US for Turkey), and dummy variables capturing day of the week effects. The conditional variance equation includes the absolute value of interventions ( t I ), the interest differential ( * t t i i − ) and day-of-the-week dummies.
Given the simultaneity problem arising between interventions and the exchange rate, lagged interventions are used instead of contemporaneous intervention. Contrary to Domac and Mendoza (2002) and Giumaraes and Karacadag (2004) , a range of lagged interventions are employed rather than intervention with a specific lag (e.g. t-2). This does not only allow to correct for simultaneity but also helps us to identify the horizon at which interventions have an impact on the exchange rate.
14 Finally, lagged values of the exchange rate are also added to the mean equation. Our baseline specification is given by equations (1a) ). The first dummy takes the value of 1 if a given intervention act is preceded by intervention activity in (t-1) and (t-2).
17 In addition to this, we also use a more loosely defined dummy, which is 1 if any given intervention is preceded by intervention during one of the preceding five days, and is 0 otherwise. Equations (1b) to (3b) show the extended specification:
14 An alternative approach would be to use instrumental variables for interventions. However, such an approach looks only at the contemporaneous effect and not at effects, which manifest at longer horizons. The lag length for interventions and for exchange rate returns is determined on the basis of the general-to-specific approach. We first include interventions (exchange rate returns) lagged up to ten (five) days, and decrease the maximum lag length until the last lag is found statistically significant at the 10% level. 15 Domac and Mendoza (2004) and Giumaraes and Karacadag (2004) show that estimation results for the mean equation are sensitive to whether a single intervention variable containing both sales and purchases as in (1) is used or whether sales and purchases are considered separately. At the same time, the use of absolute values of interventions in the conditional variance equation studies whether higher intervention volumes lead to higher or lower exchange rate volatility. However, it may be also legitimate to think that sales and purchases may impact on exchange rate volatility in a different way. 16 Ísberg and Pétursson (2003) propose to introduce, in addition to aggregate interventions, a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if aggregate interventions are large and is 0 if they are small. However, using interventions and a closely related dummy may vehicle a very similar set of information. This is the reason we break up the intervention series directly in one series containing large interventions and another one comprising small interventions. 17 Ísberg and Pétursson (2003) suggested the use of this dummy variable, which captures long intervention episodes. The equations presented thus far rest on a GARCH(1,1) model. In order to check for robustness to model specification and to look at possible asymmetries in the conditional variance equation, a number of alternative GARCH models are also used for the econometric investigation. These are
(a) the GARCH in mean (GARCH-M), (b) the exponential GARCH (EGARCH), (c) the threshold GARCH (TGARCH) and (d) the component GARCH (CGARCH).
For the GARCH in Mean, the only difference compared to the standard GARCH model is the inclusion of the conditional variance in the mean equation ( The time-varying long-term volatility converges to χ with ρ as shown in (8) 
Estimation Results
Croatia
The estimations are carried out for the whole sample from January 1996 to September 2004 and for two subperiods, namely from January 1996 to January 2000 and from April 2000 to September 2004. 18 There are a number of reasons for splitting the sample: (1) the event study approach showed that interventions were more effective during the 2000s than during the late-1990; (2) the visual inspection of the exchange rate and intervention series also suggests that the series are more volatile in the second half of the sample; and (3) a new governor was appointed in 2000.
The summary of the estimation results of the different GARCH models displayed in Tables 11a   to 11c show that the simple GARCH model appears to be sufficient to describe the data as the garch-in-mean terms (ξ ) -with one exception -, the asymmetric terms ( λ ) of the exponential and threshold GARCH models and all structural parameters of the component GARCH model are found to be statistically insignificant. The ARCH and GARCH terms (α and β ) are strongly significant and they sum up to considerably less than one for the subperiods, indicating that the data are not fractionally integrated. Therefore, we focus on the results obtained for the simple GARCH model 19 .
As far as results for aggregate interventions reported in Table 11a are concerned, interventions appear to have a negative effect on exchange rate returns for the first subsample (and for the entire sample). Recalling that kuna purchases (sales) are denoted by negative (positive) values and that the exchange rate is defined as domestic currency units in terms of one unit of foreign currency, these results imply that kuna purchases (sales) associated with a depreciation (appreciation) and that interventions are either ineffective or smoothing the exchange rate. At the same time, results for the conditional variance equation show that interventions dampen exchange rate volatility. Looking at more disaggregated intervention data largely confirm these findings: interventions have mostly a negative relationship to the exchange rate. However, some qualification is needed. Large kuna purchases 20 are negatively correlated with exchange rate returns, while small kuna purchases are found usually to be insignificant. Both large and small kuna sales tend to be negatively related to the exchange rate with a lag length of up to four days.
However, large kuna sales with a lag of six days and small kuna sales lagged with seven days are positively associated with the exchange rate. Concerning exchange rate volatility, both large kuna purchases and large kuna sales tend to increase exchange rate volatility 21 . Small domestic currency sales and purchases do not have any effect on exchange rate volatility.
Let us now turn to the second subperiod running from 2000 to 2004. Aggregate interventions turn out to be negatively correlated with the exchange rate at short lag length (1 and 2), but then start having a positive impact on the exchange rate at higher lag length (6,7 and 8). No statistical relationship could be detected between aggregate interventions and forex volatility. The analysis of interventions disaggregated in large and small sales and purchases broadly confirm that interventions first have a negative effect and then kuna purchases (sales) cause the exchange rate to appreciate (depreciate). Using interventions with a lag of one day shows that both small and large purchases and sales have a negative relationship with the exchange rate, which breaks down at a lag of two days for small purchases and sales. This relationship, however, reverses quicker than for aggregate interventions, as large kuna purchases have a positive relation with the exchange rate when lagged with two and three days. This relationship disappears at a longer horizon. At the same time, small kuna sales lagged with four and six days are found to have a positive relationship with the exchange rate. Large kuna sales and small kuna purchases turn out to cause an exchange rate depreciation and appreciation at higher lag length. Combining these results with those of the event study approach would suggest that foreign exchange interventions of the Croatian National Bank first smoothes the exchange rate and at longer horizon it manages to reverse the trend.
Unlike for aggregate interventions, there appears to be some statistically significant relationship between kuna sales and purchases on the one hand, and forex volatility, on the other. Small sales, large purchases, and in particular small purchases appear to decrease forex volatility. The dummy variable aimed at capturing the duration of the intervention is either not significant or has a wrong sign.
Turkey
For Turkey, the estimations were conducted for two periods: (a) for the entire period running Estimation results for the whole period are presented in Table 12a to 12c. They support the view that a simple GARCH model performs best. Only for disaggregated interventions for the whole period was found the threshold term of the exponential GARCH model to be significant, while the other models could not detect any asymmetry and garch-in-mean effect in the data.
Aggregate interventions are found to impact positively on the exchange rate with a lag of five days for the whole period. For the subperiod 2002 to 2004, they first have a negative impact on the exchange rate and then are correlated positively with the exchange rate at lag length of 2,5 and 10 days. Interventions dampen forex volatility only during the subperiod. When interventions are separated into large and small lira sales and purchases for the whole sample, the EGARCH model with the significant λ term shows that interventions of all kind first have a negative influence on exchange rate returns, and subsequently causes the exchange rate to appreciate (lira purchases) or to depreciate (lira sales) just as expected (see third column of Table   12b ). Nonetheless, the coefficient of both small and large lira purchases, once again, switches sign to negative at a lag length of four and seven days. As far as the relationship between interventions and forex volatility is concerned, interventions, lira purchases first dampen volatility but then are associated with an increase in forex volatility. By contrast, lira sales lead to an increase and then to a decrease in volatility as the lags increase. Taking the simple GARCH as the best model for the subperiod from 2002 to 2004 indicates that lira sales first causes the exchange rate to appreciate, then to depreciate and once again to appreciate. There seems to be no relationship between interventions and forex volatility.
Our results for Turkey are roughly in line with findings reported in Domac and (2004) who studied the period from 2001 to 2002 using EGARCH, and found that interventions had the expected effect on the exchange rate and that they lowered exchange rate volatility. However, our results are in contrast with results by Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) , who applied the asymmetric component GARCH model to data from 2001 to 2003, and found that interventions had no impact on the exchange rate and that they increased exchange rate volatility. Notes: as for Table 11a . 
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Conclusions
This paper investigated the impact of foreign exchange interventions in two EU candidate countries, namely in Croatia and Turkey by applying the event study methodology to the data, and by analyzing a variety of the class of GARCH models. The results indicate that the event study and the econometric estimations are complementary rather than competing approaches.
The event study approach can be used to analyze only a fraction of foreign exchange interventions by the Croatian National Bank because of its regular interventions leaving little time to elapse between two interventions (episodes). For the non-overlapping intervention episodes, the rate of success was found to vary between 60% and 80%. The successful episodes were mainly leaning against the wind and exchange rate smoothing. Some qualification merits mention. First, it appeared that the share of exchange rate smoothing was higher than that of leaning against the wind in the direct aftermath of the intervention episodes. However, the share of leaning against the wind steadily increases for larger post-event windows. This implies that interventions (kuna purchases/sales) first start to decrease the pace of depreciation/appreciation, and as time goes by, they even manage to change the trend on the foreign exchange market.
Second, interventions appear to be more effective from 2000/2001 to 2004 than during the late 1990s. In addition, some evidence is also found for the existence of a signaling channel.
The econometric estimations confirm the earlier finding that interventions are more effective during the second subperiod. They also reveal that the dynamics of the different types of interventions (small and large kuna sales and purchases) varies considerably. Nonetheless, the general pattern that emerges is that interventions first have a negative relationship with the exchange rate, which reverses when interventions with higher lags are used. This is broadly in line with findings of the event study approach and suggests that kuna sales/purchases dampen the pace of the kuna appreciation/depreciation in a first stage (exchange rate smoothing) and subsequently are able to reverse the trend of the exchange rate (leaning against the wind). For forex volatility, some evidence is found for that interventions are associated with lower volatility. During the late 1990s, large kuna sales and purchases are found to decrease forex Although the results of the GARCH estimations are less convincing than those of the event study approach, they also suggest that foreign exchange interventions were successful at specific lag length to change the trend of the exchange rate. The analysis of the conditional variance for the whole period indicated that lira purchases are associated first with a decrease and then with an increase in volatility. By contrast, lira sales appeared to generate more volatility in a first step, followed by some dampening effect on forex volatility. However, no relationship could be detected for the subperiod.
Combining the results of the event study and the econometric estimations suggest that both lira purchases and lira sales were successful, to some extent, in changing the trend of exchange rate movements (leaning against the wind) and lowering exchange rate volatility. These findings underline that the official policy statements of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, according to which the aim of forex interventions is to decrease forex volatility but not to affect the level of the exchange rate, are somewhat in contrast with the achievements. The question that could be asked is whether there is perhaps too much exchange rate targeting and insufficient volatility targeting?
Overall, the results of this study gives further evidence in favor of the fact that emerging market economies are in a good position to carry out (sterilized) foreign exchange interventions effectively.
Data Appendix
Daily For the interest rates, overnight money market rates are used. The data for Croatia and Germany are obtained from the Croatian National Bank and the Bundesbank, whilst the data for Turkey and the US are drawn from Bloomberg.
Large interventions are defined as interventions higher than the average of the interventions over the whole period, and small interventions are those below the average. For purchases (sales), average purchases (sales) are used even for aggregate intervention data. Thus, what is large is defined as compared to the average of the interventions in the same direction.
